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Abstract— Mobile collaborative learning (MCL) is extensively 
recognized field all over the world. It demonstrates the cerebral 
approach combining the several technology to handle the 
problem of learning. MCL motivates the social and educational 
activities for creating healthier environment. To advance and 
promote the baseline of MCL, different frameworks have been 
introduced for MCL. From other side, there is no highly 
acceptable security mechanism has been implemented to protect 
MCL environment. This paper introduces the issue of rogue 
DHCP server, which highly affects the performance of users who 
communicate with each other through MCL.  The rogue DHCP is 
unofficial server that gives incorrect IP address to user in order 
to use the legal sources of different servers by sniffing the traffic. 
The contribution focuses to maintain the privacy of users and 
enhances the confidentiality. The paper introduces multi-frame 
signature-cum anomaly-based intrusion detection systems 
(MSAIDS) supported with innovative algorithms, modification in 
the existing rules of IDS and use of mathematical model. The 
major objectives of research are to identify the malicious attacks 
created by rogue DHCP server. This innovative mechanism 
emphasizes the security for users in order to communicate freely. 
It also protects network from illegitimate involvement of 
intruders. Finally, the paper validates the mechanism using three 
types of simulations: testbed, discrete simulation in C++ and ns2. 
On the basis of findings, the efficiency of proposed mechanism 
has been compared with other well-known techniques. 
 
 General terms—Design; Development; Theory. 
Keywords—Client; DHCP server; rogue DHCP server; 
mobile learning environment; algorithms; signature-
cum anomaly based Intrusion detection; inclusion of 
IDS rules; sniffer; nikito, stick. 
I. INTRODUCTION  
The mobile devices fill the gap of communication by 
providing the matured platform for learners.  This extremely 
emerging platform has built the foundation to introduce the 
robust and faster way for promoting the pedagogical activities. 
The exploitation of mobile devices has not only encouraged 
the MCL but also created several chances for intruders 
attackers to break the privacy of users. The mobile users are  
reliant with DHCP server for getting IP address. The DHCP 
server offers well-structured and administrative service for 
mobile devices. From other side, illegal and Rogue DHCP 
server is installed in the network to capture the legal contents 
of users. Rogue DHCP server creates opportunity for intruders 
to intercept network traffic. After capturing the contents, 
intruder modifies the original contents of legal 
communicators. The intruder uses the malware and Trojans 
horse to install rogue DHCP server automatically on network.. 
If the rogue DHCP server assigns an incorrect IP address 
faster than original DHCP server, it causes the potentially 
black hole for users. To control the malicious attacks and 
avoiding the network blockage, the network administrators put 
their efforts to guarantee the components of server, using 
various tools. The graphical user interface (GUI) tool is used 
to prevent the attack of rogue detection [5]. Idea of using 
multilayer switches may be configured to control the attacks 
of rogue DHCP server but it is little bit complex and not 
efficient to detect rogue DHCP server and its malicious 
consequences. According to statement of Subhash Badri, the 
representative of DHCP Server team mentions in his online 
report that GUI tool cannot make difference between 
malicious DHCP servers and erroneously configured rogue 
[7].  The DHCP spoofing is another solution for detecting 
rogue DHCP server. However, if single segment is spoofed 
that can damage the whole network. Spooling method takes 
long time till attacker has enough time to capture the traffic 
and assign the wrong IP addresses [8]. Time-tested, DHCP 
Find Roadkil.net’s, DHCP Sentry, Dhcploc.exe and DHCP-
probe provide the solution to detect and defend rogue DHCP 
server malware [6]. All of these tools cannot detect the new 
malicious attacks. Intrusion detection systems (IDS) are also 
introduced to ensure the protection of systems and networks. 
However, IDS cannot detect the intrusion due to increase in 
size of networks. The Signature based detection does not have 
capacity to compare each packet with each signature in 
database [2].  Distributed Intrusion Detection System (DIDS) 
is another technique to support the mobile agents. This 
technique helps the system to sense the intrusion from 
incoming and outgoing traffics to detect the known attacks [1]. 
Ant colony optimization (ACO) based distributed intrusion 
detection system is introduced to detect intrusions in the 
distributed environments. It detects the visible activities of 
attackers and identifies the attack of false alarm rate [3]. 
Anomaly based intrusion detection are introduced to detect 
those attacks for which no signatures exist [4], [6], [10].Both 
signature based and anomaly based IDS have not been used to 
detect the problems of rogue DHCP server. This paper 
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introduces the multi-frame signature-cum anomaly based 
intrusion detection system supported with novel algorithms, 
inclusion of new rules in IDS and mathematical model to 
detect the malicious attacks and increase the privacy and 
confidentiality of users in MCL environment.  
 
II. PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION 
 Mobile collaborative learning (MCL) is getting high 
popularity in several fields. Everyone wants secure and 
confidential collaboration but it is vigorously affected due to 
intervention of intruder and attacker. The security flaws in 
MCL communication invite the attackers to modify the 
contents. The deployment of rogue DHCP server encourages 
the attackers to collapse the security. The rogue DHCP server 
issues incorrect IP address to user and in consequences, the 
user acknowledges negatively to wrong DHCP server. The 
attacker sniffs all the traffic sent by users to other networks 
causes the network violation. It breaks the security policies as 
well as privacy of users. MSAIDS handles this security flaws 
with support of novel algorithms, addition of new rules in 
current IDS and mathematical model 
 
III.  RELATED WORK 
 The modern technologies and its deployment in computer and 
mobile devices have not only created new opportunities for 
better services but from other perspective, privacy of the users 
is highly questionable. The network-intruder and virus 
contagion extremely affect the computer systems and its 
counterparts. They also alter the top confidential data. 
Handling these issues and restoring the security of systems, 
IDS are introduced to control malicious attackers.IDS are 
erroneous and not providing the persistent solution in its 
current shape. The first contribution in the field of intrusion 
detection was deliberated by J.P Anderson in [28].  The author 
introduced notion about the security of computer systems and 
related threats. Initially, he discovered three attacks that are 
misfeasors, external penetrations and internal penetrations.  
The classification of typical IDS is discussed in [17]. The 
focus of the contribution is about reviewing the agent-based 
IDS for mobile devices. They have stated the problems and 
strength of each category of classification and suggested the 
methods to improve the performance of mobile agent for IDS 
design.  Four types of attacks are discussed in [21] for security 
of network. They have also simulated the behavior of these 
attacks by using simulation of ns2. A multi-ant colonies 
technique is proposed in [25] for clustering the data. It 
involves independent, parallel ant colonies and a queen ant 
agent.  They state that each process for ant colony takes 
dissimilar forms of ants at moving speed. They have generated 
various clustering results by using ant-based clustering 
algorithm.  The findings show that outlier’s lowest strategy for 
choosing the recent data set has the better performance. The 
contribution covers the clustering-based approach.  
 The discussed work in [23], implements the genetic algorithm 
(GA) with IDS to prevent the network from the attack of 
intruders. The focus of technique is to use information theory 
to scrutinize the traffic and thus decrease the complexity. They 
have used linear structure rules to categorize the activities of 
network into abnormal and normal behaviors. The work done 
in [18] is about the framework of distributed Intrusion 
Detection System that supports mobile agents. The focus of 
work is to sense the both outside and inside network division. 
The mobile-agents control remote sniffer, data and known 
attacks. They have used data mining method for detection and 
data analysis. Dynamic Multi-Layer Signature based 
(DMSIDS) is proposed in [2]. It detects looming threats by 
using mobile agents. Authors have introduced small and well-
organized multiple databases. The small signature-based 
databases are also updated at the same time regularly. 
Algorithm is presented for adaptive network intrusion 
detection (ANID). The base of algorithm is on naive decision 
tree and naive Bayesian classifier [19]. The algorithm 
performs detection and keeps the track of false positive at 
balanced level for various types of network attacks. It also 
handles some problems of data mining such as dealing with 
lost attribute values, controlling continuous attributes and 
lessening the noise in training data. Work is tested by using 
KDD99 benchmark for intrusion detection dataset. The 
experiment has reduced the false positive by using limited 
resources.  Moreover, all of the proposed techniques cover 
general idea of network detection but proposed MSAIDS 
technique handles the irreplaceable issues of DHCP rogue 
server. It controls signature and anomaly based attacks to be 
generated by DHCP rogue. The contribution also prevents 
almost all types of attacks. The major contribution of work is 
to validate the technique by employing innovative algorithms, 
inclusion of new rules in tradition IDS and mathematical 
model. It also helps the legitimate users to start secure and 
reliable MCL frequently. One of the most promising aspects of 
this research is uniqueness because there is no single 
contribution is available in survey about the DHCP rogue and 
its severe targeted attacks. The reminder of paper is organized 
as follows: possible attacks of rogue DHCP server are 
explained in section-4. The proposed solutions including 
functional components are given in section-5. Simulation 
setup is explained in section-6. The analysis of result and 
discussion are given in section-7. Finally conclusion of the 
paper is given in section-8.  
 
IV. POSSIBLE ATTACKS OF ROGUE DHCP SERVER 
(SCENARIO-I) 
With deployment of latest technologies, the need for 
automated tools has been increased to protect the information 
stored either on computers or flowing on networks. The 
generic idea to protect the data and thwart the malicious 
attackers is computer security. The introduction of distributed 
system has highly affected the security [11]. 
There are several forms of vulnerabilities and vigorous threats 
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to expose the security of the systems. To take important 
security measures and enhancing the secure needs for 
organizations, several mechanisms are implemented but those 
mechanisms also invite the attackers to play with privacy and 
confidentiality of users. One of the major threats for privacy of 
data is intervention of rogue DHCP server. 
The first sign of problem associated with rogue DHCP server 
is discontinuation of network service. The static and portable 
devices start experiencing due to network issues. The issues 
are started by assigning the wrong IP address to requested 
clients to initiate the session. The malicious attackers take the 
advantages of rogue DHCP server and sniff the traffic sent by 
legitimate users.  
Rogue DHCP server spreads the wrong network parameters 
that create the bridge for attackers to expose the 
confidentiality and privacy. Trojans like DNS-changing 
installs the rogue DHCP server and pollutes the network. It 
provides the chance to attackers to use the compromised 
resources on the network. Rogue DHCP server creates several 
problems to expose the privacy of legitimate users. The most 
three important attacks are shown in figure 1. 
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           Figure 1.  Behavior of DHCP Rogue during the attack 
A. Network disrupting attack 
Rogue DHCP server makes the vague situation for legitimate 
DHCP server by sending many requests for issuance of IPs. 
This situation exhausts the pool of IP addresses of DHCP 
server, resulting it does not entertain the requests of clients for 
lease of new IPs. When process of issuance of IPs is blocked 
then rogue DHCP server appears in network as replacement of 
legitimate DHCP server. The rogue DHCP server releases the 
wrong network settings and in consequence causes the 
network disruption. 
 The DHCP server responds faster than corporate server on 
local area network for release of IP addresses. Rogue DHCP 
server continuously monitors the behavior of DHCP server 
and whenever any request comes through router for release of 
IP address, it issues the wrong IP address faster than legitimate 
DHCP server. Router does not have capability to detect issued 
IP address from rogue DHCP server. Once it issues its wrong 
IP address then continuously disrupts the network. Several 
mechanisms are introduced such as network access control 
(NAC) and network access protection (NAP) to force all the 
connected devices to be responsible for authentication to 
network.  
The devices which do not meet the criteria of authentication 
are segmented on subnet or virtual Local area network 
(VLAN). All of these methods are challenging and difficult to 
deploy to protect the network disruption from attack of rogue 
DHCP server. To employ these mechanism, DHCP snooping 
must be implemented on switches otherwise users will not be 
able to obtain the information but from other side NAC and 
NAP are limited with some specific operating systems. These 
techniques are not efficient to control the attack rogue DHCP 
server. 
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Figure.  2. Network disrupting attacking process 
It takes the control of whole network and also continues the 
connecting and disconnecting process at different intervals. 
The figure 2 shows the attacking process of DHCP rogue 
server and disruption of network. 
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B. Sniffing the network traffic 
It is brutal irony in information security that the features which 
are used to protect the static and portable devices to function 
in efficient and smooth manner; and from other side same 
features maximize the chances for attackers to compromise 
and exploit the same tools and networks. Hence packet 
sniffing is used to monitor network traffic to prevent the 
network from bottleneck and make an efficient data 
transmission. Attackers use the same resources for collecting 
information for illegal use. Rogue DHCP server substantiates 
those malicious attackers to expose the privacy of users. When 
networks are victim of rogue DHCP servers that provide very 
important information related to IP address, domain name 
system and default gateway to attackers. 
 All of this information helps the intruders to sniff the traffic 
of legitimate users. Suppose rogue DHCP server is introduced 
on secure environment to collect the confidential information. 
That server destroys all sorts of havoc on secure network. In 
the best case scenario, it simply issues the wrong IP address to 
each user, resulting all the traffic on the network starts 
monitoring on the bases of issued wrong IP address. In the 
worst case scenario, rogue DHCP server sets default gateway 
as IP address of malicious attacker’s proxy. In this case, 
attacker can sniff the traffic and wreak the privacy of users 
shown in figure 3.  
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           Figure 3. Sniffing the traffic and masquerading attack 
 
Rogue DHCP server also helps the intruders to capture the 
MAC address of legitimate users. It causes the sniffing the 
traffic through switch. In this case, attackers spoof the IP 
addresses of both sender and receiver and play the man-of-
middle to sniff the traffic and extract important contents of 
communication. It causes the great attack on privacy of users. 
The figure 4 shows the process how the IP of both sender and 
receiver are spoofed and privacy is exposed. This type of 
attack refers as masquerading attack. 
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RECEIVER
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ROGUE DHCP 
SERVER 
AFTER ATTACK
IP ADDRESS: 
192.168.11.35
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Figure 4.Spoofing of IP address and diversion of traffic 
 
C. Denial of service attack ( DOS) 
Intruders that get support through rogue DHCP server also use 
DOS attacks after sniffing the confidential contents of traffic. 
Due to DOS attack, the access of important services for 
legitimate users is blocked.  Intruders often crash the routers, 
host, servers and other computer entity by sending 
overwhelming amount of traffic on the network. Rogue DHCP 
server creates friendly environment for intruders to launch 
DOS attacks because intruders need small effort for this kind 
of attack and it is also difficult to detect and attack back to 
intruders. In addition, it is also easy to create the floods on 
internet because it is comprised of limited resources including 
processing power, bandwidth and storage capabilities. Rogue 
DHCP can make flooding attack at the domain name system 
(DNS) because target of intruders is to prevent the legitimate 
users from resolving resource pertaining to zone under attack 
[12] [13] & [16].  
These attacks on DNS have obtained varying success while 
disturbing resolution of names related to the targeted zone. 
Rogue DHCP server can take advantages of inevitable human 
errors during installation, configuration and developing the 
software.  It creates several types of DOS attack documented 
in literature [20]. [22] & [24].  Intruders with support of 
Rogue DHCP server make three types of fragile or smurf, 
SYN Flood and DNS Attacks DOS attacks shown in figure 5. 
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These attacks are vulnerable and dangerous for security point 
of view. 
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Fig.ure 5.denial of service attack (DOS) attack 
V. PROPOSED SOLUTION(MULTI- FRAME 
SIGNATURE-CUM-ANOMALY BASED INTRUSION 
DETECTION SYSTEM) 
Networks are being converged rapidly and thousands of 
heterogeneous devices are connected. The devices 
integrated in large networks, communicate through 
several types of protocols and technologies. This large 
scale heterogeneous environment invites the intruders to 
expose the security of users.  Hence, IDS are introduced 
to recognize the patterns of attacks, if they are not fixed 
strategically, many attackers cross the IDS by traversing 
alternate route in network.  
Many signature-based IDS are available to detect the 
attacks but some of new attacks cannot be identified and 
controlled. Anomaly-based IDS is another option but it 
can only detect new patterns of attack. The multi-frame 
signature-cum anomaly-based intrusion detection system 
(MSAIDS) supported with algorithms is proposed to 
resolve the issue of DHCP rogue. The proposed 
framework consists of detecting server that controls IDS 
and its related three units: (i) DHCP verifier unit (ii) 
signature database and (iii) anomaly database.  
During each detection process, intrusion detection starts 
matching from DHCP verifier, if any malicious activity is 
detected that stops the process otherwise checks other two 
units until finds and malicious activity or not. Figure 6 
shows the MSAIDS. 
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Figure  6. Multi-frame signature-cum-anomaly based IDS 
The detecting server (DS) is responsible to check the inbound 
and outbound traffic for issuance of IP address. The DS gets IP 
request (inbound traffic) from routers and forwards to DHCP 
server after satisfactory checkup. When any IP address is 
released for requested node then applies DHCP detecting 
algorithm for validation of DHCP server and detecting the 
types of attack shown in algorithm 1. 
Algorithm 1: Verify DHCP server and detecting the attack 
1. Input: MF =(FD, FS,FA & I) 
2. Output : For every strategy I € FA, I € FS, D € FD) 
3. D = Each valid DHCP Server 
4. IP= Internet protocol address 
5. N= Number of mobile devices 
6. FD= Frame DHCP server 
7.  If D € FD 
8. IP→ N 
9. endif 
10. S= Number of available signatures in signature based 
Intrusion detection system (SIDS) 
11. FS= Frame of signatures 
12. FS ⊆ SIDS 
13. I= Number & Types of attacks 
14.  For ( I=S;  I ≤ FS; I++) 
15. If   I  ⊆ FS 
16. SIDS attack alert 
17. endif 
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18. endfor 
19. A= Number of signatures available in Anomaly based 
Intrusion detection system AIDS 
20. FA= Frame of AIDS 
21. FA ⊆ AIDS 
22. For  ( I =A; I ≤ FA ;  I ++) 
23.  If  I  ⊆ FA 
24. AIDS raises alert 
25. If ( I ∉ FS & I ∉ FA) 
26.  No alert ( No attack) 
27. endif 
28. endif 
29. endfor 
 
A. The monitoring process of detecting system DS 
i. Pre-selected rule refers to those patterns, which are 
already stored in DS that helps to identify the 
inbound traffic.  
ii. Post-selected rule refers to those patters which are 
stored for detection of legitimate DHCP server that 
helps to identify outbound traffic. 
iii. Parameterized rule refers to many ingredients that 
help to set selected rules with unique value presented 
in the following: 
a. Validity ingredient: It helps to detect the attack if 
intruder modifies the contents of message. 
b. Time interval ingredient: It helps to detect two 
types of attacks which are exhaustion attack and 
negligence attack. In exhaustion attack, the attacker 
increases message-sending rate. In negligence attack, 
attacker does not send the message. In addition, time 
interval for two consecutive messages is extended or 
lessened than allowed amount of time, attack is 
considered. 
c. Flooding ingredient:  It helps to identify the attack 
on the basis of noise and disturbance to be created in 
the communication channel.  
d. Retransmission ingredient: It helps to determine the 
attack, if retransmission does not occur before 
specified timeout period. 
e. High transmission radio range ingredients: It helps 
to determine SYN flood and wormhole attack, when 
intruder uses powerful radio sending a message to 
further located node. 
f. Pattern replication ingredient: It helps to detect the 
attack when same patterns are repeated several time, 
it blocks the DOS attacks.  
All of these ingredients collectively help to DS to detect the 
attacks and figure 7 shows the process how to determine valid 
IP address and attack. 
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Figure  7. Detecting attack and issuance of safe IP 
 DS also controls the multi frame that comprises of central 
IDS and integrated with three layers that control the misuse 
detection. 
B. Central IDS  
The aim of central IDS is to control and store messages 
received from DS. It works as middleware for DS and other 
layers to send the verification request and receive the alerts. 
The main function of central IDS is to update and manage the 
policy according to attack. If it needs any change in attack 
detection that is employed on all the layers. The central IDS 
implements the updated policy is shown in figure no 8. 
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Figure 8. Policy of Central IDS for network 
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C. DHCP Verifier 
 DHCP verifier is the top layer that distinguishes between 
rogue DHCP and original DHCP server. The signatures of 
original DHCP servers are stored at the DHCP verifier. It 
checks the validity of the DHCP server which issues the IP 
address for client. On the basis of stored signatures, DHCP 
server is identified whether it is rogue or original DHCP 
server. Top layer produces the unique alert sign for both 
DHCP rogue and original DHCP. Top layer receives the 
parameters for verification from central IDS. DHCP verifier 
running on top layer is also responsible to return the alert to 
central IDS. 
D. Signature based detection layer 
Signature-based detection is middle layer that detects known 
threat. It compares the signatures with observed events to 
determine the possible attacks.  Some known attacks are 
identified on the basis of implemented security policy. For 
example, if telnet tries to use “root’ username that is violating 
the security policy of organization that is considered the 
known attack. If operating system has 645 status code values 
that is indication of host’s disabled auditing and refers as 
attack.  
If attachment is with file name “freepics.exe” that is alert of 
malware. Middle layer is effective for detection of known 
threats and using well-defined signature patterns of attack. The 
stored patterns are encoded in advance to match with network 
traffics to detect the attack. This layer compares log entry with 
list of signatures by deploying string comparison operation. If 
signature based layer does not detect any network, anomaly 
based detection layer initiates the process. For example, if 
request is made for web page and to be received the message 
with status code of 403, it shows that request is declined and 
such types of processing cannot be tailored with signatures 
based layer.  The figure 9 shows the combination of IDS rules 
applied to determine the various types of attacks with support 
of MSAIDS. 
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Figure  9.  IDS rules for detection the attacks 
 
The base of IDS comprises of five fundamental rules which 
support to IDS to determine the attack. These rules include 
detection paradigm, location for audit source, frequency usage, 
method for detection and behavior of detection method. 
All of these rules help to detect the type of the attacks which 
are created due rogue DHCP server. 
E. anomaly based detection layer 
Lower layer is anomaly based detection that identifies 
unknown and DOS attacks. It works on pick-detect method. 
This method monitors the inbound and outbound traffic 
received through central IDS. Packets are evaluated, adaptive 
thresholds and mean values are set. It calculates the metrics 
and compares with thresholds [26] & [27]. 
 On the basis of comparisons, it detects various types of 
anomalies including false positive, false negative, true positive 
and true negative. If pick-detect methods determines true 
positive and false negative then it sends alert to Central IDS. 
The process of determining the anomalies is given in 
algorithm 2. 
Algorithm 2: Detecting the types of alerts with AIDS 
1. FS= Frame of signatures 
2. FS ⊆ SIDS 
3. Si =  False Negative 
4. Sj= True negative 
5. Sk=  True positive 
6. Sk=  False positive 
7.  0 =  don’t match  & 1=  match 
m 
8. Sijkl = 1/d  ∑    Sijkl 
                  m=1 
9. Sij = { 0,  if  i & j 
10. No false negative & true positive  
11. Sij = { 1,  if  i & j 
12. false negative & true positive  
13. Alert of attack 
14. Skl = { 0,  if  k & l [ do not match] & 1, if  k &  l 
[match] 
15. Alert of true negative & false positive 
16. No sign of attack 
17. endif 
18. endif 
19. endif 
20. endif 
In addition to determine and calculate true positive, true 
negative, false positive and false negative, the following 
derivation helps: 
Here True positive= TP; False negative= FN; False 
positive=FP; True negative=TN; Precision= p; overall 
probability= OP 
We know that  
P = TP/ TP + FP -----------------------------------(1) Eq: 
OP= TP + TN / TP + FP + FN + TN ----------- (2) Eq: 
TP = P (TP +FN) ----------------------------------(3) Eq: 
Substitute the values of precision in equation no (2) 
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Therefore,   
 TP= TP/ TP + FP (TP +FN) -------------------- (4) Eq: 
OR 
TP = (TP * TP) + (TP + FN) / TP + FP -------- (5) Eq: 
OR 
TP= TP
2 +
 (TP* FN) / TP + FP 
The equation (5) shows the true positive (TP), meaning that is 
sign of attack and alarm occurs 
Now, find the false negative to apply overall probability 
formula: 
We know that overall probability formula that is given as 
follows: 
OP= TP + TN / TP + FP + FN + TN 
TP = OP (TP + FP + FN + TN) = TP + TN ----------- (6) Eq: 
Substitute the value of OP in equation (6): 
TP = TP + TN / TP + FP + FN + TN (TP + FP + FN + TN) = 
TP + TN----------------------------------------------------- (7) Eq: 
 (TP + TN) * TP + (TP + TN)* FP + (TP + TN) *FN + (TP + 
TN)*TN / TP + FP + FN + TN =  
TP +TN------------------------------------------------------ (8) Eq: 
Multiplying the values: 
(TP
2 +
 TNTP) + (TP*FP + TN*FP) + (TP*FN + TN*FN) + 
(TP*TN + TN
2
) = TP + TN (TP + FP + FN + TN) --- (9) Eq: 
Re-arranging: 
(TP
2 +
 TNTP) + (TP*FP + TN*FP) + (TP*TN + TN
2
)=( TP + 
TN ( TP + FP + FN + TN) - (TP*FN + TN*FN) 
Multiplying the (TP + TN) to the right hand side: 
(TP
2 +
 TN*TP) + (TP*FP + TN*FP) + (TP*TN + TN
2
) = (TP
2
 
+ TN*TP +FP*TP +FP*TN+ FN*TP + FN*TN + TN*TP + 
TN
2 
- (TP*FN +  
TN*FN) --------------------------------------------------- (10) Eq: 
OR 
TP
2 
+ TN*TP + TP*FP + TN*FP + TP*TN + TN
2
= TP
2
 + 
TN*TP +FP*TP +FP*TN+ FN*TP + FN*TN + TN*TP + TN
2 
- TP*FN - TN*FN 
Re-arranging the terms: 
TP
2 
+ TN*TP + TP*FP + TN*FP + TP*TN + TN
2 -
 TP
2
 -
TN*TP -FP*TP - FP*TN- FN*TP - FN*TN - TN*TP - TN
2 
+ 
TP*FN + FN*TN 
Simplifying the terms by using addition and subtraction 
function: 
FN*TN - FN*TN ---------------------------------------- (11) Eq: 
Finding the value of FN 
FN = FN * TN /TN -------------------------------------- (12) Eq: 
Divide TN with FN *TN to get FN 
FN= FN ---------------------------------------------------- (13) Eq 
OR 
FN-FN= 0 
If we get zero value that shows the false negative and 
considered as attack but no sign of alarm because of 0. 
The false positive (FP) is derived from true positive (TP). If  
We know that about the value of TP: 
TP= TP
2 
+ (TP * FN) / TP + FP 
Cross by multiplication to both sides: 
TP (TP + FP) = TP
2 +
 (TP + FN) ------------------------- (14) Eq: 
Multiplying TP to the left hand side: 
TP
2
 +TP*FP = TP
2 +
 (TP * FN) --------------------------- (15) Eq 
Re-arrange the terms: 
FNTP =TP
2 +
 TP * FP - TP
2
 
FN*TP = TP * FP ------------------------------------------ (16) Eq: 
Calculate the FP from equation (16): 
FN*TP= FP/TP --------------------------------------------- (17) Eq: 
OR 
FP= FNTP /TP 
 The equation (17) shows the false positive; there is no sign of 
attack but alarm raised. 
 Applying equation (10) to find the true negative (TN). 
Here, 
FN*TN - FN*TN 
FN*TN = FN*TN 
TN = FN*TN/ FN ------------------------------ (18) Eq: 
Dividing FN*TN by FN to find TN 
TN= TN ----------------------------------------- (19) Eq: 
OR 
TN-TN=0 
The value of TN is also zero that means there is no sign of 
alarm and no attack occurs. 
To detect the attack and non-attack situation for TN and FN. 
We use algorithm 3 to determine sign of attack. 
Algorithm 3: Determine the sing of attack or non-sign of 
attack 
I. We select random odd prime number for TN and any even 
number for FN. 
2. The value of FN must not be exceeded than TN. 
3. Therefore, FN > 1 & FN< TN 
4. Here, FN= {2, 4, 6, 8…} & TN= {3, 5, 7, 11, 13…} 
5. Here sign of attack = ST, d = not exposed & b = exposed. 
6. b and d has constant value 1. 
7. Thus, ST = TN/ (TN+ d)/ FN (FN +b) 
8. If value of ST > 1, it means there is no sign of attack, if the 
value of ST < 1 that is sign of attack. 
9. endif 
Assume FN = 2 & TN =3 
BY applying the sign of attack formula: 
ST = TN/ (TN+ d)/ FN (FN +b) 
Substitute the values in given formula. 
ST = 3/ (3+ 1) / 2(2+1) 
ST = 9/8 
ST= 1.125 
ST > 1 
Here, ST > 1 means there is no sign of attack and we will be 
able to determine that is True negative (TN). 
The behavior of TN, FN, FP& TP is shown in table 1 with 
respect to sign. 
TABLE 1: showing the behavior of attack 
parameters Behavior 
True Negative (TN) No sign of alarm and no 
attack 
False Negative (FN) No sign of alarm but attack 
True positive ( TP) Sign of alarm and attack 
detected 
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False positive ( FP) Sign of alarm but no attack 
VI. SIMULATION SETUP 
The previous sections have presented the evidence of the 
problems to be created by rogue DHCP server and including 
solutions to control over these problems. This section focuses 
on simulation setup and type of scenario. The unique and 
extensive testing method require for simulation of rogue 
DHCP server. To validate the framework, the proposed 
solution has been implemented by using three methods: test 
bed simulation, discrete simulation in C++ and ns2 simulation.  
The test bed simulation provides real time results in controlled 
and live user environments. This kind of simulation gives 
complete understanding about behavior of several types of 
attacks. All operations associated with MSAIDS approach and 
other three existing approaches: Dynamic Multi-Layer 
Signature based IDS (DMSIDS), Ant Colony Optimization 
based IDS (ACOIDS) & Signature based IDS provide the 
recital idea. Test bed simulation helps to detect the various 
affects and conditions in real environment. Therefore, output 
of simulated framework is as close to reality as possible.  The 
parameters of test bed simulation are only given in table 2. 
TABLE 2: Simulation parameters for test bed experiment 
Name of parameters Specification 
 
MySQL database MySQL 5.5 
Type of IDS Rule based IDS 
GD Library gd 2.0.28 
Snort V-2 
Apache web server Apache http 2.0.64 Released 
PHP  PHP 5.3.8 ( General purpose server side 
language) 
ADODB Release 5.12 (abstraction library for PHP 
and Python) 
ACID  ACID PRO 7 
Stick Stick beats detection tool used by 
hackers 
Nikito Nikito v.2.1.4 
 
IDS enabled system Memory: 512 MB 
Operating system: Linux 
PCI network card: 10/100 Mbps 
CPU: P-III with 600 MHz 
Attacker system Memory: 1.5 GB 
Operating system: Linux 
PCI network card: 10/100/1000 Mbps 
CPU: AMD Geode LX running 
2.4/5GHz 
In addition, stressed network traffic load creates several 
exceptional conditions that motivate to test the idea on Linux 
and window NT operating systems. It is little bit harder to 
collect the data in live environments by using test bed 
simulation due to some logistical issues. Most of operating 
systems do not provide the tracing facilities but regardless of 
problems, we would like to obtain the result in standardized 
method by using different programs on different operating 
systems. MSAIDS has fully support of algorithms and data 
structure that discover the potential attacks and perturb the 
intrusions before the attacks.  
The performance highly depends on robust tracing facility and 
algorithms, which help to identify the intrusion. As the first 
step is to analyze the performance of proposed algorithms and 
used mathematical model. However, overall target is to obtain 
accurate statistical data in highly loaded network. Test bed 
simulation does not provide 100% result. To fulfill 
requirements of tracing and collecting accurate data, same 
scenario is simulated in ns2 and discrete simulation c++. The 
mean value is calculated for three kinds of simulations with 
help of following theorem. 
Theorem 1: 
Assume x = test bed simulation;  
y= discrete simulation in C++ & ns2 simulation. 
R is the proposed approach MASIDS. 
Thus, Let f: [x, y] → R is the continuous function for closed 
interval [x, y] 
Therefore  
Let f: [x, y] → R is the differentiable continuous function for 
open interval (x, y) 
Here x < y. 
Hence z exists in (x, y) 
Such that 
f’ (x) = f (x) – f (y) 
            ____________ 
     x- y 
 
 The second important step is in context of IDS what is the 
most important response, if once possible attack has been 
detected? It is really broader topic and beyond of the scope of 
this research. The proposed method is not panacea but at least 
detects masquerading, DOS and race condition attacks to be 
generated by DHCP rogue in MCL. The idea of controlling the 
attack of rogue DHCP server is quite general but might be 
efficient to enhance the security of asynchronous teller 
machine (ATM) machines, heterogeneous network 
environment, COBRA and distributed object systems. 
 The paper emphasizes how to fit proposed method to control 
the attacks of rogue DHCP server in MCL environment. 
Figure 10 is NAM screenshot of ns2 for MSAIDS, in which 
node-3 is rogue DHCP server that assigns the fake IP. Node-4 
is attacker that tries to capture the traffics. Node-5 is MSAIDS 
(proposed approach) that makes an attack of node-4 (attacker) 
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in vain. In consequences, sender and receiver exchange the 
data successfully. 
The scenario is highly congested with large amount of traffic 
in real but standardized environment.  
1 74
52
20.45
MSAIDS.nam
Nam: MSAIDS.nam
3
Step: 3.0 ms
File Views Analysis
DHCP SERVER
ROGUE DHCP 
SERVER
6
SENDER
RECEIVER
ATTACKER
MSAIDS ROUTER
 
                Figure.10. NAM screenshot of a MSAIDS 
VII. ANALYSIS OF RESULT AND DISCUSSION 
The training period of experiment covers four classes of 
attacks probe, DOS, U2R and R2L. All detected attacks are 
included in database during the training period in test bed 
simulation. Ns2 and discrete simulation in C++ provides 
tracing facility to collect accurate data. The MSAIDS scans 
all rules of snort and includes new rules explained in 
proposed section 3. The testing period targets one concise 
scenario. The scenario is simulated by using same parameters 
for all three existing approaches including our proposed 
MSAIDS. The attacks are generated by using stick, covering 
all types of signatures and anomaly based attacks.  
The training period provides quite interesting results because 
frequently generated attacks are of different numbers. The 
maximum number of attacks pertains to R2L category. The 
more attacks are also counted on MSAIDS as compare with 
other three existing techniques are shown in table no.3. If 
attack is not generated then it is counted as normal traffic. 
The frequency of single and group characters is displayed 
when packets reach at the attacker machine. It is observed on 
the basis of output that different types of detected attacks are 
generated due to rogue DHCP server. 
The DOS attacks are detected when packet does not reach at 
destination and received no acknowledgment. The sign of 
probe attack is addition of new data in existing amount of 
data bytes. U2R is the sign of maximum connection duration. 
R2L attacks are little bit complex to detect. We apply method 
comprises of service requested and duration of connection for 
network and attempts failed login for host. It shows that 
proposed approach does not restrict the generating ratio of 
packets. From other side, the proposed approaches provides 
highest capturing ratio. The statistical results show that 
MSAIDS will substantiate to medical field for diagnosing 
several disease and especially for heart. The major 
breakthrough of this research is to detect the true positive and 
false negative attacks because they are very hard to capture.  
TABLE 3: showing statistical data for attacks 
Due to these anomalies, confidentiality of any system is 
exploited and privacy of the user is exposed. The proposed 
method also captures the real worm attacks and all other 
looming attacks. The table 4 shows quantitative results for 
each scheme.  
TABLE 4: Showing quantitative data for proposed and existing schemes 
The major advantage of MSAIDS approach is to detect all 
Type of 
generated 
attack 
(MSAIDS) (DMSIDS) (ACOIDS) Signature 
based IDS 
DOS attacks 34214 33542 33421 32741 
U2R attacks 12454 11874 11845 11341 
R2L attacks 34123 32123 31092 29984 
Probe 
attacks 
6214 8758 10181 4907 
Parameters  (MSAIDS)  (DMSIDS)  (ACOIDS) Signature 
based IDS 
total no: of packet  to 
be received 
236719 198678 201938 178109 
total no: of packet  to 
be analyzed 
236456 192453 197842 170098 
total no: of attack  to 
be generated 
87005 86293 86539 78973 
total no: of signature 
based attack to be 
generated 
42003 42287 42585 35098 
total  no: of anomaly 
based attack to be 
generated 
a. False positive 
b. False negative 
c. True positive 
d.True negative 
 a. 9475 
b. 12093 
c. 18574 
d. 4860 
 
a. 8574 
b. 11987 
c. 16943 
d. 6502 
 
a. 8878 
b. 12007 
c. 16943 
d. 6126 
 
a. 8458 
b. 11289 
c. 12455 
d. 11673 
 
Total number of 
anomaly based attack 
to be generated 
45002 44006 43954 43875 
total no: of attacks to 
be captured 
87002 84212 83434 36098 
Anomaly based 
attacked captured 
a. False positive 
b. False negative 
c. True positive 
d.True negative 
 a. 9475 
b. 12093 
c. 18574 
d. 4859 
 
a. 8324 
b. 11456 
c. 15678 
d. 6324 
 
a. 8678 
b. 11987 
c. 16789 
d. 6045 
 
a. 654 
b. 245 
c. 453 
d. 535 
 
total number of 
anomaly based attacks 
to be captured 
45001 41782 43499 1887 
signature based attacks 
to be captured 
42001 42102 41091 34211 
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types of anomalies and unknown threats efficiently. The 
systems are mostly infected due to new sort of malwares 
because they consume the processing resources of system. If 
resources of system are utilized by unnecessary programs then 
MCL is highly affected. In consequence, collaboration process 
is disrupted. 
MSAIDS also detects the activity for any specific session. It 
creates specific alarm for each type of anomalies.  
Furthermore, deployed algorithms and new addition of rules in 
ordinary IDS improves the performance and restore the 
privacy of users. The implementation of MSAIDS is supported 
with sound architectural design that is robust and can persist 
when attack is detected. Statistical data shows 99.996% 
overall efficiency of MSAIDS shown in table 5.  
The efficiency of MSAIDS is calculated with following 
formula: 
Here, overall efficiency = Ea;  
Total generated signature based attacks = TSA; 
Total anomaly based attacks =TAS;   
Missed signature based attacks = MSA; 
Missed anomaly based attacks = MAA & total generated 
attacks = TGA. 
Thus, Ea =   (TSA + TAA) – MSA + MAA) * 100 / TGA 
TABLE 5:  Overall efficiency of MSAIDS VS other approaches 
 
The proposed MSAIDS framework produces 2.269 to 49.11 
higher capturing-rates than other existing techniques. The 
more interesting work of this research is detailed expression of 
all types of anomalies separately in form of false positive, 
false negative, true positive and true negative. These 
parameters give the concrete idea to use the features for 
various types of applications in real environment. The figure 
10 shows the capturing capacity of MSAIDS and other 
existing techniques with respect the time during the testing 
period. 
Figure 11. Comparison efficiency of all approaches 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, multi-frame signature-cum anomaly-based 
intrusion detection systems (MSAIDS) is presented. MSAIDS 
controls malicious activities of DHCP rogue server to restore 
the privacy of users during MCL. The paper highlights all the 
malicious threats to be generated by DHCP rogue. The 
intruders use the DHCP server to sniff the traffic and finally 
deteriorate the confidential information. The mechanism of 
current IDS does not have enough capability to control the 
threats. Furthermore, several daunting and thrilling challenges 
in the arena of computer network security are impediment for 
secure communication. DHCP rogue is visibly very simple but 
crashes the network as well as the privacy of the users and 
even creates nastier attacks like Sniffing network traffic, 
masquerading attack, shutting down the systems and DOS. 
The first is detailed explanation of these attacks and how they 
are generated by DHCP rogue.  
To resolve this issue, second propose the technique that is 
based on algorithms, mathematical modeling and addition of 
new rules in current IDS. These all of the components of 
proposal collectively handles the issues of DHCP rogue.  To 
validate the proposal, the technique is simulated by using two 
different kinds of systems, as one is reserved for attacker and 
other one is for legitimate user.  On the basis of simulation, we 
obtain very interesting statistical data, which show that 
MSAIDS improves the capturing performance and controls the 
attacks to be generated by DHCP rogue as compare with 
original IDS and other techniques. The findings demonstrate 
that MSAIDS has significantly reduced the false alarms. The 
findings demonstrate that MSAIDS has significantly reduced 
the false alarms. Finally, we analyze the overall efficiency of 
MSAIDS and existing technique by showing the results in 
Parameters MSAIDS DMSIDS ACOIDS Signature 
based 
IDS 
Packet  analysis 
capacity 
(Mean value %) 
99.88 96.866 97.971 95.5 
Anomaly based 
attacked captured 
(Mean value %) 
a. False positive 
b. False negative 
c. True positive 
d. True negative 
a. 100 
b. 100 
c. 100 
d. 99.979 
 
a. 97.084 
b. 95.570 
c. 92.533 
d. 97.262 
 
a. 97.747 
b. 99.833 
c. 99.091 
d. 98.677 
 
a. 7.732 
b. 2.170 
c. 3.637 
d. 4.583 
 
Total number of 
anomaly based  
attacks to be captured 
(Mean value %) 
99.997 94.946 98.964 4.3 
signature based attacks 
to be captured 
(Mean value %) 
99.995 99.562 96.491 97.472 
Overall efficiency of 
different approaches 
99.996 97.254 97.727 50.886 
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tabular form and plotting the impact of results.  In future, this 
technique will be deployed in measure the heart beats and 
other disease. Furthermore the broader impact of this research 
is to substantiate the MCL and improve the pedagogical 
activities and fostering other organizational requirements. This 
research will also boost the confidential level of the people 
while using MCL.  
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APPENDIX: 
 
 
Figure 12: Process of capering Anomaly based attacks with discrete 
simulation in C++    
 
Figure 13: The process of capturing signature based attacks (IDS) with 
Discrete simulation in C++. 
 
